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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 With The Contracting State,1 Professor Jody Freeman continues 
her foray into the role of private actors in government functions, an 
area in which she has staked her claim as a leading authority. As 
Freeman has elsewhere noted, private regulation can take many 
forms: It can involve an industry organization imposing require-
ments on its members, interest groups negotiating how to limit or 
condition private conduct that affects them, the state contracting for 
goods or services, or the state entering into agreements about how to 
implement or enforce regulations that already exist. 2 The Contract-
ing State suggests that these forms of regulatory contractual rela-
tionships all reflect some jumble of private law and public law under-
standings that structure the relationships between the government, 
regulated entities, and putative beneficiaries of these seemingly 
schizophrenic regulatory programs. The Contracting State does limit 
its analysis to bilateral contracts, 3 but the article still covers an 
                                                                                                                  
 * Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. B.A., Reed College, 
1975; M.A., Brandeis University, 1979; J.D., Stanford University, 1983. 
 1. See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2000). 
 2. See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543 (2000). 
 3. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 160 (noting that the bulk of The Contracting State 
is devoted to public-private contracts). I borrow the term “bilateral” from Daniel Farber to 
refer to contracts between the state and the regulated entity. See Daniel A. Farber, Trian-
gulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of Environmental Protection, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 61 (distinguishing “bilateral bargaining” between an agency and a 
regulated entity from other forms of voluntary regulation). Although bilateral contracts 
raise some interesting issues, I believe that administrative law can accommodate such con-
tractual processes more easily than Freeman’s other forms of private governance because 
the state ultimately retains authority and responsibility for regulations. A scheme in 
which the state acts only as a facilitator for private regulation opens the process to greater 
abuse by the representatives of the various interest groups that participate. See generally 
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amazing breadth of regulatory circumstances. Placing these along 
the continuum that The Contracting State describes, the article in-
cludes within its ambit the following types of agreements: (i) pro-
curement contracts, (ii) contracts under which private entities per-
form government services, (iii) agreements between administrative 
agencies and regulated entities regarding implementation or en-
forcement of regulations, and (iv) contracts between an agency and a 
private entity that specify the requirements that govern the regu-
lated conduct of the entity. 
 Freeman contends that administrative law has not addressed the 
role of contracts in regulation.4 She argues that regulatory contracts, 
or more particularly the importation of contract principles into the 
regulatory arena, can enhance accountability.5 Whether that impor-
tation will increase accountability depends, in her view, on particular 
circumstances; she counsels that in many contexts private law may 
not sufficiently take into account the special role of the state in regu-
latory contracts. 6 Nonetheless, the tenor of her article suggests that 
principles of administrative law have developed without any consid-
eration of private bargaining and, therefore, that we must develop a 
new administrative law, one that ensures that contractual regulation 
does not allow abuses by the private contractors or undermine ac-
countability of regulatory programs. Although Freeman does not 
specify particular developments that would improve accountability in 
a world of regulatory contracts, she hints at a need to permit contrac-
tors to hold the state strictly to its contractual bargains7 and to allow 
putative beneficiaries a greater role in negotiating and enforcing cer-
tain types of regulatory contracts. 8 
 I agree with Freeman’s assessment that regulation by agreement 
between the state and the contractor or regulated entity adds a sig-
nificant arrow to the quiver of regulatory mechanisms. Like her, I 
have concerns about how the courts will address such contracts. I, 
however, do not see contract mechanisms as a means of providing 
regulatory accountability, but rather as a means of avoiding the 
overbreadth of traditional regulation and of assigning roles required 
by the regulatory state to those best able to perform them. Moreover, 
I fear that emphasis on contract as a means of providing accountabil-
ity will lead to incorporation of contract law principles that will seri-
ously undermine the flexibility of current administrative processes. 
Unlike Freeman, I am not certain that administrative law’s lack of 
                                                                                                                  
Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for 
Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000). 
 4. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 198-99. 
 5. See id. at 201. 
 6. See id. at Part.III.A.3. 
 7. See id. at 158. 
 8. See id. at 201. 
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explicit reference to contractual processes reflects ignorance. Rather, 
I believe that current understandings of administrative law recog-
nize that over the past several decades much of regulation has been 
implemented through contract-like processes. Moreover, current un-
derstandings seek to place such processes within a framework that 
allows administrative agencies leeway to structure and implement 
regulatory programs as they think best. So viewed, to a great extent, 
administrative law already accommodates bilateral bargaining proc-
esses and, with merely a little tweaking, provides sufficient account-
ability for most of the types of bilateral regulatory contracts that 
Freeman discusses. 
 This Comment begins by reviewing the potential benefits of regu-
latory contracts, stressing in particular that those benefits flow from 
attributes of contractual relationships other than the desire to hold 
the government accountable for regulatory policy. The Comment goes 
on to describe what I consider basic understandings of the current 
administrative state—that the principal checks on agency policymak-
ing are procedure and politics. Finally, the Comment considers what 
these understandings imply about how courts should treat govern-
ment contracts. In particular, the Comment analyzes how these un-
derstandings inform when and how government contracts should be 
enforceable by the nongovernment party or by the public beneficiar-
ies of the contracts for the four types of contracts Freeman identifies 
in her principal paper. 
II.   BENEFITS OF REGULATORY CONTRACTS 
 Agencies, like other organizations, whether public or private, have 
always relied on contracts for buying many of the goods and services 
they use while performing their tasks. 9 A private provider may enjoy 
an advantage from specialization because it already produces the 
needed good for the private market. Specialization leads to economies 
of scale and superior know-how, which in turn allow the private 
company to produce a superior product at a lower cost than could the 
agency. It makes no sense for an agency to produce its own office pa-
per just because it uses a lot of it. 
 Private providers may enjoy the advantage of superior know-how 
even when the product supplied to the agency is not produced for any 
                                                                                                                  
 9. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Eric W. Orts, Environmental Contracts in the 
United States, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND REGULATORY INNOVATION:  COMPAR-
ATIVE APPROACHES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (Kurt Deketelaere & Eric W. Orts 
eds., forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 1-3, on file with the author). Whether a firm should 
rely on the market to provide goods and services rather than providing the good itself has 
been the subject of classic articles. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Produc-
tion, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.  ECON.  REV. 777 (1972); 
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, The 
Logic of Economic O rganization, 4 J.L. ECON. & O RG. 65 (1988). 
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other users. The private company may produce similar, although not 
identical, products for others. Thus, for example, it is probably wise 
that the Air Force contracts with airplane manufacturers for its mili-
tary aircraft rather than trying to design and manufacture these 
planes in-house. 
 Traditionally, agencies have been reluctant to contract out core 
governmental services—services that rely on the state’s monopoly 
over the ultimate coercive powers of seizing property and arresting 
and confining criminals. As Freeman notes, that reluctance stems in 
part from the perception that there is something inherently wrong 
with having private entities exercise such coercive powers.10 It may 
also stem from doubts about whether private companies enjoy any in-
formational or scale advantages with respect to such services, which 
the government has almost always performed itself.  
 Nonetheless, there is a realization today that private providers 
may in fact have advantages even in performing such governmental 
services. 11 For example, consider a complex plant that the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulates for work-
place safety. Although OSHA may well be more knowledgeable than 
the operator of that plant about how to apply OSHA’s standards, and 
even about how to search a plant for violations of those standards, 
the operator clearly has more knowledge of the structure and opera-
tions of its particular plant. That knowledge may translate into the 
operator’s being the cheaper and more effective monitor of regulatory 
violations or designer of plant-specific regulatory requirements, as-
suming it can be given an incentive to perform those jobs aggres-
sively and in good faith.12 The necessity of providing sufficient incen-
                                                                                                                  
 10. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 172-74. 
 11. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE , RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 103-06 (1992); EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING 
BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 219 (1982); cf. Richard 
B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 
CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1354 (1981) (“Because of limitations of budget, personnel, time, and 
working experience, regulators cannot hope to develop in-house all the information and 
specialized experience needed to make effective regulatory judgments in a timely fash-
ion.”). 
 12. The plant operator’s superior ability to monitor violations is behind OSHA’s “High 
Injury/Illness Rate Targeting and Cooperative Compliance Program.” The agency applied 
the program to plants whose poor safety record warranted frequent inspection. It promised 
less frequent inspection to those employers who participated in the program, creating an 
incentive for companies to perform such monitoring. Despite the program’s demonstrated 
success when tested in Maine, the D.C. Circuit struck down the program, ostensibly be-
cause the agency failed to use proper procedure to promulgate what the court termed a 
substantive regulation. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Department of 
Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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tives to ensure that companies self-regulate in good faith is one cru-
cial barrier to universal contractual regulation.13  
 Contracts transferring state functions to private entities might 
also be desirable as a means of avoiding inefficiencies that stem from 
the state’s monopoly position. For example, a private garbage hauler 
might be more efficient than a government-run operation because the 
private hauler has had to struggle to survive in a competitive market 
and therefore, unlike the government, has structured its operations 
to attract customers and keep costs down. The state might also hope 
to save costs by avoiding constitutional limitations when it transfers 
the exercise of its coercive powers over property and persons to a pri-
vate organization. If, however, these limitations apply because of the 
coercive nature of the power rather than the lack of market con-
straints on that power, then the avoidance of these limitations by 
transferring the coercive power to a private entity seems inappropri-
ate. In fact, the lack of political accountability of private entities 
might warrant subjecting them to greater limitations in exercising 
such power. 
 Finally, contractual regulations are desirable because they are 
more entity-specific than general regulations. 14 Contracts often take 
into account the design of an entity’s plant, its location, and other 
unique features. Contractual regulations thus can increase regula-
tory benefits by deviating from the general regulations set for all 
similar plants. Specificity is not limited to contract; the government 
could adopt plant-specific regulations without resorting to voluntary 
contractual commitments from the regulated entity.15 The specificity 
of the information needed to write such regulations and the resources 
needed to police them, however, pragmatically mandate that the gov-
ernment act in cooperation with regulated entities, 16 and entities are 
                                                                                                                  
 13. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE , supra note 11, at 106; see also Stewart, supra note 11, 
at 1346-47 (noting that success of consensus-based regulation depends on “private parties 
believ[ing] [that] their interests lie in cooperation”). 
 14. See Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The “Criminology of the Corporation” and 
Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 67, 73 (Keith Hawkins & 
John M. Thomas eds., 1984) (observing that “general rules often make little sense if ap-
plied rigidly to all particular cases”). 
 15. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines “rule” to include “[any] state-
ment of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement . . . law 
or policy.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 16. See James Gustave Speth, Foreword to BEYOND COMPLIANCE: A NEW INDUSTRY 
VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT at ix, x (Bruce Smart ed., 1992) (asserting that “in the end 
only the corporate community can efficiently provide the necessary organization, technol-
ogy, and financial resources needed to design and implement change on the scale required” 
to implement the environmental changes necessary for the future); see also Bruce A. Ac-
kerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 
1343 (1985) (advocating marketable permits in part on the ground that marketability puts 
the regulatory “information-processing burden precisely where it belongs: upon business 
managers and engineers who are in the best position to figure out how to cut back on their 
plants’ pollution costs”). 
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much more likely to cooperate if they can veto the final agency prod-
uct by refusing to agree. Hence, for many government permits, which 
essentially are site-specific regulations, the government negotiates 
the details with the regulatory entity even though it is free to impose 
conditions in the permit without the entity’s consent. 17 
III.   CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 Current understandings of administrative law derive from the 
post-World War II period that gave rise to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).18 In that era, a blueprint of administrative govern-
ance that can be characterized as the “public interest” model domi-
nated conceptions about how agencies went about their job of regu-
lating.19 This model was bilateral in nature, with the two parties en-
titled to participate being the regulated entity—usually envisioned 
as a member of some industry—and the regulating agency. Industry 
members were permitted to present evidence and their views regard-
ing the regulatory decisions that directly affected them. They were 
also entitled to seek judicial review to ensure that agency regulations 
did not undermine legislative deals that struck a balance between 
the interests of the industry and those of putative beneficiaries of the 
regulatory program. The interests of these beneficiaries were pre-
sumed to be protected by the agency. Thus, while the public techni-
cally could comment on agency-proposed rules, putative beneficiaries 
were not seen as proper parties to challenge agency decisions as be-
ing insufficiently protective of their interests, and they were excluded 
entirely from implementation and enforcement of agency regula-
tions. 20 
 Under the public interest model, keys to accountability were pro-
cedural requirements and political oversight. The APA mandated ju-
                                                                                                                  
 17. For example, in issuing a permit to allow an incidental take of an endangered spe-
cies by destruction of the species’ habitat, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS) and a developer seeking a permit negotiate a habitat conservation plan (HCP). 
The plan, signed by the USFWS, the developer, and sometimes by state and local govern-
ments, binds the developer and precludes the government from imposing additional miti-
gation measures barring extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances. See J.B. Ruhl, How 
to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act “HCP” 
Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345, 402-04 (1999); see also Donald C. 
Baur & Karen L. Donovan, The No Surprises Policy: Contracts 101 Meets the Endangered 
Species Act, 27 ENVTL. L. 767, 771-77 (1997). 
 18. The APA, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, was passed in 1946. 
 19. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1682-83 (1975) (noting that faith in agencies’ pursuit of the public in-
terest has withered); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 
ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 576-78 (1992); see also Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Histori-
cal Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1265-72 (1986). 
 20. See Stewart, supra note 19, at 1713. 
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dicial-type procedures for fact-finding in formal adjudications. 21 In 
addition, the Due Process Clause ensured that even when formal 
APA procedures did not apply, agencies could not deprive regulated 
entities of their property without first holding extensive fact-finding 
proceedings.22 In rulemaking, the procedures were more streamlined 
and did not distinguish between the interests of regulated entities 
and those of the public to participate in the agency proceeding. Fre-
quently, however, regulated industries developed ongoing relation-
ships with agency staff and the staff of congressional committees re-
sponsible for the particular programs to which these entities were 
subject. These relationships allowed regulated entities to pressure 
agencies, both directly and via the threat of congressional action.23 
The agency, however, remained responsible for the ultimate decision. 
Courts rarely second-guessed the substance of agency decisions. 24 
Unless the regulated entity could show that the decision violated a 
deal struck in the agency’s authorizing legislation or that the deci-
sion effected a taking of property, courts generally deferred to agency 
decisions. 
 The late 1960s saw the rise of the interest group representation 
model of administrative law.25 Political scientists and economists 
identified the problem of agency capture,26 and shortly thereafter en-
trepreneurs of grass roots activism organized broad-based interest 
groups with the stated goal of protecting the public in regulatory 
matters. 27 Courts began to reject the assumption that agencies would 
act to protect regulatory beneficiaries, and they created legal doc-
trines that gave representatives of such beneficiaries access to most 
administrative proceedings on par with the access enjoyed by regu-
lated entities. For example, courts allowed putative beneficiaries to 
                                                                                                                  
 21. See MARTIN SHAPIRO,  WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATION 40-41 (1988). 
 22. See Stewart, supra note 19, at 1673. 
 23. See id. at 1713-14. 
 24. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 1267-68, 1271. 
 25. See generally Stewart, supra note 19, at 1723-60. 
 26. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 
86-90, 155-60 (1955); see also George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL 
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). For a comprehensive discussion of capture and the par-
ticular mechanisms by which it can come about, see PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE 
IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981). 
 27. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 74 (1986) (noting the importance of the emergence in the late 
1960s of “many new groups—ranging from Common Cause and Ralph Nader’s Public Citi-
zen to the National Urban Coalition and the Migrant Legal Action Project—representing 
broad publics and the less advantaged”); see also GRAHAM K. WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS 
49-50 (1990) (remarking that a wide range of interest groups representing broad-based, 
diffuse interests had developed since the 1970s). 
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intervene in licensing proceedings that would affect their interests28 
and granted them standing to bring judicial challenges of agency de-
cisions.29 Congress also began to place burdens on agency decision-
making by requiring agencies to collect and analyze information on 
matters that would affect the public generally, such as environ-
mental impacts. 30 
 Despite the decreased trust in administrative agencies that ac-
companied the interest group representation model, changes in ad-
ministrative law did not alter the fundamental notion that agencies 
have broad discretion to structure and administer their regulatory 
programs. Judicial review of agency action under the “arbitrary and 
capricious” rubric granted the courts an active role in checking ad-
ministrative abuses. In some instances, courts exercise their author-
ity seemingly because they disagree with the outcome of an agency 
decision. But substantively, the fundamental guarantors of account-
ability remain procedures combined with politics. For example, the 
“hard look” doctrine, which many complain has hamstrung agency 
abilities to administer programs, 31 is fundamentally procedural in 
nature: it demands that an agency fully consider all relevant factors 
before making a decision and explain how its decision reflects those 
factors. 32 Rarely do courts strike down agency decisions for being un-
reasonable or simply wrong rather than for being unreasoned.33 
Hence, even when courts strike down a decision as arbitrary and ca-
pricious, the agency often has significant leeway to reinstate the de-
cision if it accompanies the reinstatement with sufficient explana-
tion.34 If the hard look doctrine has had a significant effect on agency 
                                                                                                                  
 28. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 
994, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power 
Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 
412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
150, 158 (1970). 
 30. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 
Stat. 852, 853-54 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994)). For an account of 
how NEPA’s data collection and analysis requirements significantly changed administra-
tive law, see Rabin, supra note 19, at 1286-88. 
 31. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Proc-
ess, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86, 1419 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Ef-
fects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Elec-
tricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 8 (1991). 
 32. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 
(1983); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 33. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to 
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 491-92 
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 
177, 183; Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of 
the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 636-37 (1994). 
 34. See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through In-
formal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 415-17 (2000). In some cases, the D.C. Circuit 
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authority, it is mostly because Congress has refused to grant agen-
cies the resources they need to perform the kind of analyses the doc-
trine requires for all but the most pressing problems. This, however, 
may not be accidental; instead, it may be Congress’s way of limiting 
agency power, and therefore it may be entirely consistent with politi-
cal accountability (at least to the extent one finds the legislature suf-
ficiently accountable). 
 Judicial treatment of challenges that contend that agencies acted 
beyond their statutory authority also manifest the substantive lee-
way that current understandings grant to administrative agencies. 
The seminal case of NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,35 established 
the precedent that when Congress legislates a national solution to a 
regulatory problem, to the extent that Congress has not precisely de-
fined the bounds of statutory terms, the courts should defer to the 
agency’s construction when the agency applies the statute to resolve 
a particular case.36 The notion that courts should defer to agency in-
terpretations of statutes was further developed in Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co.,37 in which the Court noted the propriety of giving weight to 
carefully considered agency positions even when the agency was not 
a party to the case.38 The principle of deference to statutory interpre-
tation reached its zenith in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.39 In Chevron, the Court stated that in 
the face of statutory ambiguity or silence, courts should defer to a 
reasonable agency interpretation of a statute that the agency admin-
isters. 40  
 I admit that not all cases support the understanding that judicial 
review should provide limited substantive constraints on agency de-
cisionmaking. In particular, two Supreme Court opinions that stretch 
to find clarity in seemingly ambiguous language41 seem out of charac-
                                                                                                                  
has taken to remanding rules without vacating them, which indicates some expectation 
that the agency can and will cure any problems in justifying the rule following remand. 
See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (stating that whether an inadequately supported rule should be vacated depends on 
the seriousness of problems in reasoning and the extent of disruption that an interim 
change would cause); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rule-
making, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 75-78 (1995) (supporting such remands without vacation as 
a means of reducing burdens on agency rulemaking). 
 35. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 36. See id. at 130-31. 
 37. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 38. See id. at 140. 
 39. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 40. See id. at 843-44. 
 41. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1316 (2000) 
(holding that despite tobacco’s coming within a literal reading of one provision of the Food, 
Drug & Cosmetic Act, the intent of the statute as a whole was to preclude FDA jurisdiction 
to regulate tobacco); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 (1994) (ac-
cepting one dictionary definition of the word “modify” over another in holding that the FCC 
did not have the power to excuse telephone companies from filing tariffs for FCC approval). 
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ter with the understanding that judicial review will play a limited 
role in ensuring substantive agency accountability. These cases, 
however, are of very recent vintage. The courts have not assessed 
their full implications for traditional regulatory processes, let alone 
contractual processes. Nor have the courts clearly accepted the teach-
ings of these cases into administrative law doctrine. 
 Thus, despite these recent cases, I stick to my assertion that cur-
rent administrative law understands most complex regulatory pro-
grams as reserving to the administering agency authority to exercise 
broad discretion, but as requiring the agency to provide access and 
procedures that allow all stakeholders in the program to identify and 
publicize their concerns with agency decisions. So long as the agency 
indicates that it took those identified problems seriously and did not 
treat them in a manner inconsistent with the agency’s legislative 
mandate, the agency eventually will be able to act as it sees fit. 
IV.   ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S ACCOMMODATION OF BILATERAL 
CONTRACTUAL PROCESSES 
 Having laid out the uses of bilateral contracts in regulatory pro-
grams and the basic foundations of current administrative law, I 
turn now to discuss how current law treats the various types of regu-
latory contractual mechanisms mentioned by Freeman. In particular, 
I will discuss current methods aimed at ensuring the accountability 
of such contract mechanisms, analyze how public law would suggest 
resolving some unanswered questions regarding accountability, and 
finally analyze the impacts that might occur were one to borrow con-
tract law principles to increase accountability for such mechanisms. 
A.   Procurement Contracts 
 In terms of accountability, procurement contracts pose the fewest 
problems for the intersection of public and private law. With respect 
to the contractor, the government acts as any other contracting party 
rather than as a regulator; hence, there is usually no need to balance 
public law principles against those of private contract law. But even 
procurement contracts can be troublesome when the government, 
purporting to act in its regulatory capacity, makes performance of 
the contract impracticable or unlawful. In such a situation, two prin-
ciples of contract law collide: First, in private contracts a party is ex-
cused from performance when supervening events, including regula-
tory change, render the party’s promise to perform impracticable.42 
Second, a party to a contract cannot, however, avail itself of the im-
                                                                                                                  
 42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1979). The party may still be 
liable for failure to perform when either the language of the contract or the circumstances 
indicate that the party assumed the risk of the supervening events. See id. 
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practicability defense when its own conduct is responsible for the im-
practicability.43 The first principle recognizes the need for govern-
ment to address problems that warrant regulatory action, while the 
second protects against moral hazard.44 
 The solution to this collision is to distinguish between government 
regulatory actions justified on grounds independent of the contract 
and actions taken only to improve the government’s position as a 
contractual party. In theory, this distinction may be difficult to draw, 
and prevention of governmental moral hazard may justify more than 
minimal scrutiny by the courts to ensure that regulations which ren-
der government contracts impracticable have sound justification in-
dependent of improving the government’s contractual position.45 
Were one concerned only with accountability, the government would 
be held to the terms of its contract. But the law has generally recog-
nized that government must have the flexibility to change regula-
tions in response to changes in circumstances, even when its own 
contracts are incidentally affected. 
 The precise boundary between regulation motivated by the pros-
pect of escaping contractual obligations and that prompted by inde-
pendent concerns for the public interest was at the heart of the Su-
preme Court’s recent controversial decision in United States v. Win-
star Corp.46 Winstar involved Congressional passage of the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
                                                                                                                  
 43. See id. 
 44. A moral hazard occurs when a party to a transaction can engage in behavior that 
changes the risks to the oth er party associated with the transaction. See MARK 
SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS  74 (1996). 
 45. See Hazard & Orts, supra note 9, at 21-22. Hazard and Orts suggest that the dis-
tinction is more one of degree than kind and that it makes little sense to maintain it. They 
suggest that the unfairness of having the government renege on its contractual agree-
ments warrants rejecting the distinction between government as sovereign and govern-
ment as contractual party. See id. at 11. They do not, however, directly address the prob-
lems of inflexibility that would adhere to forcing the government to pay damages when it 
adopts regulatory changes that make contractual performance impracticable. Moreover, as 
long as the government is not motivated by the benefit of breaching its contracts, the un-
fairness Hazard and Orts perceive is no greater than the unfairness that occurs when gov-
ernment regulation precludes performance of purely private agreements; yet no one sug-
gests reading the Takings and Contracts Clauses of the Constitution to require the federal 
and state governments to pay damages when regulatory change interferes with purely pri-
vate contracts. Finally, Hazard and Orts’ suggestion that contractual processes involving 
stakeholders somehow are more democratic than traditional modes of administrative ac-
tion is fanciful because it ignores the facts that pragmatically, some affected interests will 
invariably be excluded from the process and that interest groups often take positions 
counter to the true interests of their members. See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 429-45; cf. 
Stewart, supra note 19, at 1763-64 (describing the impracticability of ensuring that all in-
terests are represented in any interest representation conception of the regulatory proc-
ess). 
 46. 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
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(FIRREA),47 which overrode favorable accounting treatment that the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board had given to savings and loan asso-
ciations (S&Ls) that had purchased the liabilities of other, failing 
S&Ls. Some have read the highly fractured decision in Winstar to 
suggest that the government will be strictly held to its contractual 
obligations. 48 A close reading of the opinions, however, indicates a 
majority consensus that the government should not be held to its 
contractual promise when regulation that primarily affects more 
than the government contracts renders performance impracticable. 
The plurality and concurrence seemed to agree that there should be 
“a rebuttable presumption that by entering a contract the Govern-
ment does not promise to curtail the exercise of its sovereign power 
that could affect contractual performance,”49 but that “governmental 
action that affects only the Government’s obligations on its own con-
tracts and lacks broader regulatory effects on private contracts is 
unlikely to [absolve the Government of liability].”50 Hence, outside of 
the unique facts of Winstar,51 the opinions in that case reinforce the 
traditional understanding that the government retains leeway to 
pass general regulations without incurring liability for performance 
of ancillary contracts that is rendered impracticable by such regula-
tion. 
 From the perspective of regulatory beneficiaries, procurement 
contracts again are not particularly problematic, albeit not for the 
reasons Freeman states. Freeman asserts that there are no third-
party beneficiaries of procurement contracts. 52 But that is not true. If 
the Air Force pays $500 for an ordinary wrench, the taxpayer is ad-
                                                                                                                  
 47. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.). 
 48. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy 
of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1152 (1997) (noting that seven Justices 
supported their different conclusions with the same economic reasoning that stressed the 
government’s need to make credible contractual commitments). 
 49. Joshua I. Schwartz, Assembling Winstar: Triumph of the Ideal of Congruence in 
Government Contracts Law?, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 481, 556 (1997). The most controversial 
aspects of Winstar flow from the conclusion, shared by the plurality and concurrence, that 
the Bank Board’s approval of the purchasers’ accounting treatment of supervisory goodwill 
constituted a promise to indemnify the purchasers should subsequent regulation prohibit 
this treatment. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 865-66. Once the Court so read the transactions 
between the Board and the purchasing S&Ls, the line the plurality drew between actions 
as sovereign and actions as contractor and the line it drew between what the government 
did and what it did not unmistakably promise are entirely consistent with the purposes of 
the two underlying principles of contract law. 
 50. Schwartz, supra note 49, at 555. 
 51. Winstar was decided against a background of the government’s statutory obliga-
tion to pay insured account holders when S&Ls fail. Because of this obligation, although 
both the Bank Board contracts and FIRREA affected the likelihood of S&L failures and 
hence the public interest, the primary impact of both was upon the government as insurer 
and hence was attributable to the government as contractor rather than as sovereign. See 
Winstar, 518 U.S. at 868-70. 
 52. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 165 n.44. 
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versely affected. Hence, contractual provisions limiting the price of 
procurement benefit the public fisc and thereby benefit the taxpayer. 
Moreover, if the Air Force buys a plane that cannot meet the specifi-
cations stated in the contract, the national defense may be compro-
mised. Hence, virtually every resident of the United States is a bene-
ficiary of these specifications. 
 One might restate Freeman’s contention to read that the class of 
beneficiaries is so broad that it is unwise to involve the judiciary to 
protect them. In legal terms, the harm is generalized, hence the 
beneficiaries have no standing.53 This is an accurate characterization 
of the law, but even if a government contract benefit would redound 
to a discrete class of individuals there are good reasons for barring 
enforcement actions by the beneficiaries. Government often has a 
continuing relationship with its providers and values their continu-
ing cooperation to take advantage of future opportunities for con-
tracting.54 Government might even wish to exploit efficiencies that 
might result from modification of the very contract on which the 
beneficiaries would sue. The beneficiaries, however, often do not have 
an incentive to maintain a cooperative relationship with the pro-
vider; they may be uniquely affected by the current contract and 
therefore prone to resist forfeiting their benefits for the greater good 
of other beneficiaries of future contracts. Thus, allowing particularly 
identified beneficiaries to enforce government contracts is likely to 
chill cooperation between the government and the contractor that 
might be essential for the government’s overall program.55 
                                                                                                                  
 53. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989) (plurality opinion); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974). 
 54. See Stewart MacCauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM.  SOC.  REV. 55, 63 (1963); see also IAN R. MACNEIL,  THE NEW SOCIAL 
CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 40-59 (1980) (emphasiz-
ing the roles of norms such as mutuality and flexibility in developing the cooperation that 
drives long-term contractual relationships). 
 55. Thus, citizen suits have been blamed for the reticence of industry to engage in 
searching environmental audits. See Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Carey Ann Mathews, En-
vironmental Democracy, 22 J. CORP. L. 395, 407 (1997) (reporting that, of the companies 
that did conduct environmental audits [nearly 75% of those polled], 45% were hesitant to 
expand their auditing program because they feared their self-policing would be used 
against them in citizen suits and enforcement actions); State Attorneys Quiz Browner on 
Audits, Federal Facilities, Criminal Investigations, 1994 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) D-13 
(Mar. 23, 1994), available at WL 1994 DEN 55. But see Press Release, EPA, EPA Audit 
Was Substantial Impact on Corrections of Violations by Industry (Jan. 17 1997), available 
at 1997 WL 16810, at *2 (noting that during 1996, 105 companies voluntarily reported e n-
vironmental regulatory violations at over 350 facilities). More generally, industry partici-
pants in alternative environmental compliance programs consider “a sine qua non for the 
likely success of [a] program [to be] the rather limited role throughout of public environ-
mental organizations.” DANIEL P. BEARDSLEY, INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPROVEMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED INNOVATIVE PROGRAMS IN THE STATES AND 
EUROPE 13, 31 (1996). 
228  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:215 
 
B.   Contracts to Deliver Entitlements or Exercise Coercive 
Governmental Powers 
 The second type of contract Freeman identifies involves govern-
ment arranging to have private entities exercise coercive governmen-
tal powers—the powers to deprive an individual of life, liberty, or 
property. To this category I have added contracts to have private en-
tities deliver entitlements, because the crucial issues surrounding 
such contracts involve the protection of constitutional rights—either 
those of individuals who are coerced or those of individuals to whom 
the entitlement is owed. 
 If one ignores the impact on constitutional rights, contracts calling 
for private entities to exercise coercive government powers are 
merely a subset of procurement contracts. The government pays for a 
private entity to perform a service for which the contracting agency 
is responsible. The impact on rights is crucial, however, because such 
rights provide an important check on the government’s exercise of 
such coercive power; having granted the government such extraordi-
nary powers, the Constitution seeks to ensure that the government 
invokes them only in circumstances that warrant their use.56 Since 
the need for rights stems from the nature of the power, it follows that 
the government should not be able to sidestep the limitations af-
forded by these rights merely by hiring an independent contractor to 
do the miserable deeds.  
 When government decisions affect individual rights, political ac-
countability provides additional checks on abuse of the government’s 
coercive powers. Because private contractors are not politically ac-
countable, I would argue that they should be subject to greater con-
straints when making decisions affecting such rights. In fact, that 
seems to comport with a recent decision of the Supreme Court. In 
Richardson v. McKnight,57 the Court held that guards at a prison run 
by a private company do not enjoy qualified immunity from good 
faith conduct that results in deprivations. 58 
 Contracts to have private entities deliver entitlements potentially 
raise different issues regarding constitutional protections than do 
                                                                                                                  
 56. Upon proposing the first amendments to the Constitution, James Madison said 
that the object of the Bill of Rights “is to limit and qualify the powers of government, by e x-
cepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the government ought not to act, or 
to act only in a particular mode.” Representative James Madison, Remarks on the Floor of 
the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in NEIL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 803, 808 (1999). 
 57. 521 U.S. 399 (1997). 
 58. See id. at 412. The Court, however, explicitly reserved judgment on the question of 
whether private prison guards act under color of state law and hence are subject to § 1983 
actions. See id. at 413. My analysis suggests that private prison guards should be deemed 
state actors, since they exercise fundamental coercive powers that cannot legitimately be 
exercised without an express grant from the state. 
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contracts to exercise coercive power. Government entitlements would 
warrant treatment similar to that accorded rights that protect 
against misuse of the state’s coercive powers if such entitlements—
the so-called new property—were considered as fundamental as tra-
ditional property and liberty interests. But by their nature they are 
not.59 First, unlike deprivation of traditional liberty and property in-
terests, the provision of entitlements does not constitute a function 
reserved to government. Private charities provide many of the same 
goods and services to the needy as do government entitlement pro-
grams.60 Second, while traditional property interests are protected 
from uncompensated state confiscation by the Takings Clause, and 
traditional liberty interests cannot be altered by the state even if it is 
willing to pay compensation, the Constitution provides no barrier to 
the state substantively altering or even eliminating entitlements. 61 
Finally, procedural protections against arbitrary deprivations of tra-
ditional property and liberty are premised on a notion of “moral jus-
tice,” which aims at reaching the correct answer to whether a person 
violated the law before fining or imprisoning her. Procedural protec-
tions against arbitrary deprivations of entitlements, however, are 
premised on “bureaucratic justice,” which aims to maximize benefits 
to the class of those entitled by law to receive them.62 Thus, the test 
for whether the government has violated the Due Process Clause 
when depriving one of an entitlement permits agency procedures 
that result in remediable errors so long as the cost of the additional 
procedures to avoid such errors outweighs the expected cost of the 
deprivation to the recipient. 63 This distinction in the goals of proce-
dural protection is another manifestation of the importance that cur-
                                                                                                                  
 59. Even Charles Reich, who championed the recognition of government entitlements 
as the “new property” for both procedural and substantive purposes, was more concerned 
that the government would leverage such entitlements to restrict more fundamental liber-
ties such as those guarantied in the Bill of Rights than that the denial of such entitlements 
would directly deprive individuals of something fundamental. See Charles A. Reich, The 
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 756-64, 785 (1964). 
 60. See Rob Atkinson, Altrusim in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 501, 605-
06 (1990) (describing goods and services provided by nonprofit organizations). 
 61. The legal authority to change entitlement programs was starkly demonstrated 
when Congress modified, and in the long term essentially eliminated, federal welfare. See 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). Case law has held consistently that the Constitution does not 
protect individuals from loss of entitlements, even when the entitlement program involved 
the individual paying money to support the program. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 
603, 617 (1960) (holding that a statute that retroactively made aliens who had been mem-
bers of the Communist party subject to deportation and, upon deportation, forfeited their 
entitlement to social security retirement payments was not a taking of property). 
 62. See JERRY L. MASHAW,  BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE:  MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 23-34 (1983) (distinguishing the “bureaucratic rationality” from the 
“moral judgment” models of bureaucratic decisionmaking). 
 63. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (setting forth the test). 
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rent administrative law places on allowing the agency flexibility to 
implement its regulatory programs efficaciously. 
 Because the nature of power exercised by a private company un-
der a contract to provide entitlements is not essentially governmen-
tal, whether actions by the company, even when compelled by the 
contract, should be subject to constitutional limitation is a difficult 
issue. On the one hand, contracting out the task of providing enti-
tlements diffuses the role of the government. Because the govern-
ment no longer controls individual determinations of eligibility for 
entitlements, such contracting renders unlikely the threat of imple-
mentation that, sub rosa, reflects illegitimate factors. 64 Hence, to the 
extent constitutional rights protect against government overstepping 
its legitimate powers, there is no need to hold contractors to be state 
actors. On the other hand, the value of the entitlement to those re-
ceiving it is no less important because it is actually delivered by a 
private entity. Hence, to the extent that constitutional protections 
guard the beneficiaries, as a class, from arbitrary implementation, 
these protections should apply to the private provider just as they 
would if the government had implemented the program itself. Su-
preme Court cases addressing whether private conduct constitutes 
state action have generally drawn the line at actions that are attrib-
utable to the state and situations where the state, along with the 
private actor, is involved in the actual decision that the plaintiff al-
leges violates his rights. 65 The Court, however, has yet to resolve the 
extent to which private contractors distributing entitlements on be-
half of the state constitute state actors.66 
                                                                                                                  
 64. See Reich, supra note 59, at 760-64 (discussing the potential for government to 
leverage entitlements to force individuals to forfeit rights). 
 65. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); see also American 
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (holding that an initial denial of in-
surance benefits by a private insurance company under a regulatory program requiring 
employers to obtain workers’ compensation insurance was not state action, even though 
the state specified the precise bounds of covered claims). 
 66. Freeman suggests that in Shalala v. Grijalva, 526 U.S. 1096 (1999), the Court de-
termined that decisions by health management organizations (HMOs) regarding Medicare 
coverage pursuant to contracts with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
were not state action. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 185 n.126. As she noted, however, the 
Supreme Court merely vacated the court of appeals’ decision that such decisions were state 
action and remanded with instructions to reconsider the case in light of American Man u-
facturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999). See id.; see also Shalala, 
526 U.S. at 1096. In Sullivan, the Court noted that the decision involved regulated insur-
ance benefits that had always been provided by private insurers. Hence, the Court’s deci-
sion granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding simply ask s the lower courts to address 
the HMO contractor situation in light of its recent opinion regarding workers compensa-
tion insurance, and it does not hold that HMO decisions regarding Medicare benefits are 
not state action. 
 The most relevant decision regarding conduct by contractors of the state is Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). In that case, the Court held that the firing of a vocational 
counselor in a private school for troubled youth was not state action, even though the 
counselor’s position was funded by the state and most of the school’s funding came from 
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 Regardless of how one comes out on the state action question, the 
goal of bureaucratic justice that undergirds due process require-
ments for entitlements suggests that contracts intended to avoid 
problems related to the state’s monopoly position may not warrant 
application of due process protections to the private contractor. The 
position of the contractor in a competitive market may provide ade-
quate protection for the class of intended beneficiaries of the entitle-
ment program. 
C.   Settlement Agreements for Enforcement Actions 
 A third type of regulatory contract Freeman identifies consists of 
agreements between an administrative agency and a regulated entity 
regarding enforcement of the agency’s regulatory program. Such 
agreements typically occur after an agency has identified a violation 
of the statute or regulations that it administers. Instead of commenc-
ing a judicial or administrative action seeking a fine from the viola-
tor, the agency invites the violator to negotiate an agreement regard-
ing future compliance, payment of penalties, or voluntary restrictions 
of conduct or provision of benefits, which the agency often has no au-
thority to order directly.67 
 From the perspective of the violator, the other party to these set-
tlement agreements, the agreements may be problematic because 
they allow the agency to leverage its implementation and enforce-
ment discretion to cajole conduct that Congress did not explicitly au-
thorize the agency to order. Some have objected to this use of agency 
discretion because public choice theory cautions that agencies have 
an incentive to use such leverage to maximize their power, and there 
are seemingly bounds on what an agency may legitimately require in 
such voluntary agreements.68 If I am correct in reading the primary 
constraints on agency conduct as procedural and political, the use of 
such agreements is, in theory, not problematic. So long as the agency 
gives affected groups an opportunity to participate in negotiating 
such agreements, justifies the ultimate agreement it reaches in 
                                                                                                                  
the state. See id. at 840-42. The Court noted that the state did not dictate the decision to 
fire the counselor and had little interest in the personnel matters of the school. See id. at 
841-42. 
 67. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 309-10 (1999) (describ-
ing Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) and noting how the EPA has created 
them as an enforcement mechanism that was never statutorily authorized); see also David 
A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits of Environmental Enforcement Reform: The Case of Sup-
plemental Environmental Projects, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1184-91 (describing the EPA’s 
policy on SEPs in detail and arguing generally that SEPs decrease the cost to violators of 
EPA regulations and hence discourage the deterrent effect of potential penalties for viola-
tions). 
 68. See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional 
Delegations of Authority , 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 883, 911. 
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terms of the statutory provisions the agency implements and the 
situation it faces, and does not contravene any explicit statutory pro-
hibition, then the agency has afforded opponents an opportunity to 
marshal political support against its program and has not acted in 
disregard of any direct legislative pronouncement on the issue. In 
many contexts, however, agency procedures fail to provide a visible 
process that allows those affected to make their concerns known to 
the agency and ultimately to Congress. In almost all contexts, en-
forcement settlements either are not judicially reviewable at all or 
receive at most a soft glance, rather than a hard look, from reviewing 
courts. 69 
 Enforcement settlement agreements also raise interesting ques-
tions from the perspective of the purported beneficiaries of regulatory 
programs. Such agreements implicitly treat regulations as imperfect 
but malleable instruments for implementing regulatory policy.70 A 
general regulation may be ill-suited for a particular plant; the plant 
owner may serve the goals of the agency’s regulatory program more 
effectively and at a lower cost by taking actions different from those 
mandated by the regulation.71 A well-publicized example involved 
application of a Clean Air Act regulation aimed at reducing benzene 
emissions to an Amoco oil refinery.72 Compliance would have cost 
tens of millions of dollars but reduced benzene emissions only mar-
                                                                                                                  
 69. See id. at 926-29 (describing how courts should review administrative consent de-
crees). The conditions I list under which I find enforcement settlements theoretically unob-
jectionable imply that such settlements should be subject to judicial review akin to that 
which applies to other agency regulatory actions. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43. 
 70. Settlements are consistent with a “compliance” rather than a “deterrence” view of 
enforcement. See Albert A. Reiss, Selecting Strategies of Social Control over Organizational 
Life, in ENFORCING REGULATION 23, 23-26 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984) 
(describing and distinguishing compliance and deterrence systems of enforcement); Cento 
G. Veljanovski, The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement, in ENFORCING REGULATION, su-
pra, at 171, 172 (noting that the compliance model of enforcement relies upon bargaining 
between the regulator and violator and is “sensitive to the economic and practical difficul-
ties surrounding compliance”). 
 71. See Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, The Enforcement Process in Regulatory 
Bureaucracies, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 70, at 3, 12-13. 
 72. This instance of bargaining over enforcement to achieve an environmentally and 
economically superior outcome was brought to popular attention by a best seller bemoan-
ing the extent to which regulatory rigidity undermined common sense. See PHILIP K. 
HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 7 (1994). 
Howard recounts a situation where an EPA rule, implemented after years of development, 
required specific equipment to be put in smoke stacks in order to filter benzene. See id. 
Amoco Oil Company spent an estimated $31 million at its Yorktown, Virginia, refinery to 
comply with the rule. See id. However, later discussion between Amoco and EPA officials 
led to the realization that the rule was almost completely ineffective in practice, as the 
benzene was primarily emitted at the loading docks rather than at the smokestacks. See 
id. “Once EPA and Amoco officials . . . realized the problem, the solution was easy and 
relatively inexpensive. Meanwhile, pursuant to the rigid dictates of a thirty-five-page rule 
that many government experts had spent years fine-tuning, Amoco had spent $31 million 
to capture an insignificant amount of benzene at the smokestack.” Id. 
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ginally.73 Amoco agreed to take precautions against leaks at the 
docks where gasoline was loaded into barges, thereby providing sig-
nificantly greater reductions in benzene emissions at a much lower 
cost. 74  
 A plant may find compliance difficult for reasons beyond its con-
trol, and the agency may decide that it is not in the public interest to 
force the plant to close down. The enforcement action settlement pro-
cess recognizes the potential weaknesses in general regulations and 
views the enforcement process as a subsequent stage in the process 
of designing regulations that are tailored to the particular context in 
which they will apply. 
 Given that enforcement settlement is really part of the process of 
tailoring regulation, beneficiaries of the regulatory program have a 
strong claim for inclusion in settlement negotiations. There is no 
guarantee that the agency will represent beneficiaries’ regulatory in-
terests in the settlement. Agency staff may be softer on violators 
than is warranted simply to avoid the extra work that flows from 
having to maintain a credible threat of actually bringing an enforce-
ment action. More generally, the agency may negotiate for idiosyn-
cratic benefits in return for a promise not to prosecute, rather than 
benefits that actually accrue to the intended beneficiaries of the 
regulatory program.75 In fact, one study of enforcement suits con-
cluded that regulated entities often viewed the enforcement process 
as an opportunity to bargain with regulators free from influence by 
regulatory beneficiaries.76  
 Thus, lessons of public choice theory and political science about 
agency capture and malaise support inclusion of representatives of 
regulatory beneficiaries in this process. Nonetheless, administrative 
law has generally not included putative beneficiaries of regulatory 
programs in the administrative enforcement process. Despite some 
early rumblings by the Supreme Court suggesting that individuals 
sometimes could sue an agency to enforce the law,77 Heckler v. 
                                                                                                                  
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Dana, supra note 67, at 1195-1200; see also Peter Schuck, The Curious Case of 
the Indicted Meat Inspectors, HARPER’S MAG., Sept. 1972, at 81-83 (describing how meat 
inspectors developed a norm that permitted them to accept small gratuities from packers 
as part of a system to get them to apply regulations in a reasonable fashion). 
 76. See Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance 
in the Regulatory Process, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 735, 757-58 (1996) (noting that bargaining 
over settlements of litigation allows a company to negotiate with an agency in secret about 
the scope of a rule). 
 77. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1975) (holding that the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1994), obligated the Secre-
tary of Labor to give reasons for failing to file suit on behalf of a candidate for a union of-
fice who alleged a violation of the Act, and that the Secretary’s decision not to sue was sub-
ject to judicial review to determine whether it was arbitrary and capricious or contrary to 
law). 
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Chaney78 sent a strong message that regulatory enforcement was 
committed to agency discretion by law and hence was unreviewable.79 
 The need for greater participation of beneficiaries in the enforce-
ment settlement process would seem to support Freeman’s implicit 
pitch for using contract principles to increase agency accountability. 
One mechanism that would empower beneficiaries would be to au-
thorize them to sue on behalf of the government for injunctions 
against continued violations. There are, however, countervailing con-
cerns. As described earlier, the benefits of regulatory contracts often 
derive from cooperation between the regulated entity and the agency 
in a continuing relationship. The agency benefits by getting informa-
tion from a regulatory violator that makes enforcement much easier 
and the ultimate remedy efficient. Agencies generally do not have re-
sources to enforce all of their regulations, and having to deal with an 
industry of recalcitrant regulated entities exacerbates the drain en-
forcement places on dear regulatory resources. 80 Hence, the agency 
may sacrifice achieving immediate compliance for cooperation that 
will help maintain overall compliance with its regulatory program. 
Interest groups that represent beneficiaries often do not have the 
same goal of ensuring that the regulatory program operates effec-
tively overall. Unlike the agency, a local interest group organized to 
promote a single goal related to regulatory compliance, like ensuring 
that no hazardous substances leak from a particular hazardous 
waste disposal facility, has little incentive to take into account the 
greater public good that can come from compromising on enforce-
ment. 
 The reasons such interest groups might not be willing to compro-
mise to serve the public interest are legion. First, the benefit from 
compromise may come at another locale, so that the group’s members 
are best served by intransigent enforcement. Second, the nature of 
the benefits may be unrelated to the goals of the group. Hence, the 
group leaders will not get credit for compromising in order to secure 
such benefits, which would decrease the attractiveness of the group 
to potential members. Since group leaders have their own interests 
in seeing the group maintained, they might forfeit these other bene-
fits, even though they go in part to group members, to avoid threats 
to the continued viability of the group.81 Finally, a subset of individu-
als may be dedicated to fighting the industry “bad guys.”82 For these 
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viation of group leaders’ interests from those of group members, see Seidenfeld, supra note 
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individuals, regulations are not malleable and open to reconsidera-
tion in order to account for more particular circumstances. Rather, 
they are rules with moral force whose violators must be brought to 
justice.83 Members of these hard-core interest groups are likely to 
take satisfaction in stopping enforcement settlements altogether. 
Thus, they have an incentive to sue, regardless of the nature of the 
violation and the cost to society from preventing it. 
 The analysis above suggests a return to the fundamental under-
standing of administrative law—that stakeholders should have ac-
cess to make their arguments, but not power to dictate final regula-
tory outcomes. Citizen suit provisions, which are included in numer-
ous regulatory acts and almost every environmental statute, provide 
a mechanism that, at least theoretically, can achieve this under-
standing. Citizen suits permit any group with standing to sue to en-
join a regulatory violation and generally allow the group to recover 
attorney fees and costs for its effort. 84  
 Virtually all citizen suit provisions, however, provide that suit 
may be commenced only after the plaintiff has given the agency ad-
ministering the statute notice, and only if the agency has not itself 
commenced a judicial enforcement action against the alleged violator. 
If the agency brings its own action for enforcement, interest groups 
that might otherwise sue generally can intervene in the agency ac-
tion.85 Hence, such groups have an opportunity to comment on any 
proposed court-approved settlement of the enforcement action.86 In 
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essence, by authorizing private entities to enjoin violations, but al-
lowing the agency to block such suits by bringing its own actions, 
citizen suit provisions check against agency dereliction of prosecuto-
rial duties in a manner that allows affected interest groups to state 
their concerns before a court; but they do not allow these groups the 
ultimate decision about whether and when compliance should occur. 
 Citizen suits have not always worked to encourage the agency to 
make responsible enforcement decisions after input from stake-
holders—that is, to deliberate over enforcement settlements. A major 
problem with citizen suits today is the underfunding of agency en-
forcement. Agencies do not have the resources to file their own ac-
tions in every citizen suit that the agency believes warrants settle-
ment.87 Instead, citizen suits have been used to provide meaningful 
enforcement without the agency having to spend its resources. 88 
Some increase in funding for enforcement is probably necessary if 
citizen suit provisions are to result in deliberative settlements. An-
other barrier to meaningful input into settlements by stakeholders is 
the reluctance of the courts to review settlements of enforcement ac-
tions with any rigor.89 Because enforcement involves the prioritiza-
tion of agency resources, courts are loathe to get actively involved in 
the process even once the agency has brought an action.90 If courts 
viewed the settlement process as part of an ongoing process of regu-
latory design, they might be willing to apply review akin to the hard 
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look doctrine to enforcement action settlements. That review would 
go a long way toward making the agency take the concerns of af-
fected interest groups seriously when negotiating such settlements. 91 
D.   Contractual Regulations 
 The formulation of provisions that, ex ante, specify the bounds of 
the regulated entity’s conduct is the last type of regulatory contract 
Freeman identifies. The conventional wisdom is that until recently 
agencies rarely used such contractual regulations, but they now have 
become staples of regulatory reinvention programs such as the EPA’s 
Project XL.92 Project XL, however, has prompted significant criticism 
from environmental interest groups. 93 National groups have little in-
centive to participate in projects with only local significance, and lo-
cal groups often do not have the expertise to counter the factual as-
sertions of the project sponsors. 94 Perhaps more importantly, the 
sponsors get to select which stakeholders to involve in the negotiat-
ing process and ultimately the extent to which they can participate.95 
Virtually all sponsors have limited involvement by environmental in-
terest groups to ensure that groups with a reputation for taking a 
hard line against development are not directly involved in negotiat-
ing the agreement.96 Hence, Project XL may not be a good template 
for involvement of stakeholders in the process of negotiating contrac-
tual regulations. 
 Instead of emulating experimental programs like Project XL, 
regulators may do better by taking a close look at some traditional 
regulatory programs. Many traditional regulatory programs require 
companies to obtain permits before operating, and the permitting 
process in fact, if not in theory, actually involves contractual regula-
tion. Under most permit programs, the applicant for a permit must 
meet some objective minimal standard. If the applicant meets that 
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standard, the agency often has discretion to structure the permit to 
further broad statutory goals. The process of formulating a permit 
almost always involves the agency working with the applicant to 
achieve what is best for the program and the applicant. In other 
words, the agency and the applicant often negotiate permit require-
ments, and the applicant only obtains a permit if both it and the 
agency agree to those requirements. 97 
 Under some permitting programs, the agency negotiates the de-
tails of the permit with the applicant and then provides notice of its 
intent to issue the permit. Stakeholders may then be provided an op-
portunity to comment on the permit before the agency issues it, and 
permits are subject to judicial review as final agency action.98 This 
permitting process generally implements administrative law’s fun-
damental requirement of meaningful opportunity for stakeholder 
participation, with ultimate responsibility remaining with the 
agency. The process does, however, suffer two weaknesses. First, 
stakeholder involvement may come at too late a stage to have much 
chance at influencing the mandates in a permit. 99 Once the agency 
and the applicant have agreed to the details of the permit, the agency 
is unlikely to reopen issues it considered resolved because of the con-
cerns of affected third parties. Second, even were the agency to allow 
earlier input about the substance of a permit by stakeholders, there 
may not be sufficient publicity about the application for the permit 
and the potential impact of the applicant’s proposed operations to 
generate significant stakeholder involvement at these early stages. 
But minor tweaking of the process—imposing obligations on the 
permit-issuing agency to inform the public prior to negotiating the 
proposed permit and to identify and invite to the negotiation groups 
affected by the applicant’s proposed activity—would significantly al-
leviate these shortcomings. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Professor Freeman has described how regulators increasingly use 
contract as an important weapon in their arsenals. 100 She suggests 
that administrative law has not explicitly taken into account the use 
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of this weapon and that perhaps public law should allow greater op-
portunities for private enforcement of government contracts, both by 
the other parties to the contracts and by those intended to be benefit-
ted by them. 101 This Comment suggests that although administrative 
law doctrine rarely explicitly recognizes contract as a regulatory 
mechanism, that doctrine includes understandings that allow for the 
use of contracts as a regulatory mechanism. These understandings, 
however, suggest that increasing the ability of private entities to en-
force government contracts is not an appropriate mechanism for 
holding agency policy democratically accountable. 
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